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We investigate firm-level determinants of capital structure using a large sam-
ple of 4,284 Japanese firms over a 19-year period (i.e., over 61,000 firm-year
observations), a hitherto less examined sample for this purpose. We conduct
our analysis and interpret our findings predominantly within the pecking
order, the trade-off and the agency theoretical frameworks. We uncover three
new findings. First, our evidence indicates that insights derived from the
extant literature on capital structure are cross-national and are applicable in
the context of Japan, despite the unique characteristics of Japanese firms. Sec-
ond, financial crisis significantly impacts the relationship between leverage
and firm-level determinants, particularly accentuating the effect of asset tangi-
bility and growth. Third, product market competition significantly impacts the
observed relationship between firm-level determinants and leverage. Our
results are robust, controlling for the joint effects of competition and crisis.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Within the realm of corporate finance, Modigliani and
Miller's (1958, 1963) irrelevance theory forms the basis
for empirical and theoretical studies on the financing
decisions of firms. The central proposition of the irrele-
vance theory is that the value of a firm is not driven by
its capital structure (Frank & Shen, 2019; Grosse-
Rueschkamp, Steffen, & Streitz, 2019). Although based
on restrictive assumptions, the irrelevance theory
inspired the development of further theories, including
the pecking order and the trade-off theories (Antill &
Grenadier, 2019; Chen, Harford, & Kamara, 2019;
Nicodano & Regis, 2019). These subsequent theoretical
developments suggest that the choice of capital structure
is not random (Inderst & Vladimirov, 2019; Ji, Mauer, &
Zhang, 2019; Lemmon & Zender, 2019). Whilst this claim
has received support from a large body of literature
suggesting that firms' characteristics affect their capital
structure decisions (e.g., Ahmed & Hla, 2019; Asad,
Gulzar, Bangassa, & Khan, 2019; Céspedes, González, &
Molina, 2010; Danso & Adomako, 2014; De Jong, Kabir,
& Nguyen, 2008; Fosu, 2013; Muradoglu & Sivaprasad,
2012; Ranasinghe, 2019; Wang, Manry, & Rosa, 2019), it
is reasonable to argue that other, unexplored, factors,
such as financial crisis and product market
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characteristics may also influence capital structure
(Alexandridis & Hasan, 2019; Elmagrhi, Ntim, Malagila,
Fosu, & Tunyi, 2018; Harris & Roark, 2019). This natu-
rally raises some questions: (a) Would the traditional cap-
ital structure determinants remain important in product
markets in which firms traditionally enjoy special lend-
ing relationships with large major banks; and (b) Would
the traditional capital structure determinants remain
important, where firms belong to large industrial group-
ings and are subject, largely, to effective monitoring? We
address these questions through a focus on the capital
structure decisions of Japanese firms.
The unique characteristics of Japanese firms that set
them apart from their counterparts in other developed
countries helps to enrich our paper's perspective. In par-
ticular, a considerable number of Japanese firms belong
to industrial groupings, known as “Keiretsu.” These firms
form a special relationship, often led by a major affiliated
bank, aimed at their mutual success (Choi, Hiraki, &
Landi, 2014; Dakua, 2019; Hatani & McGaughey, 2013;
Nakateni, 1984). Further, these firms have cross-
ownership of each other, fostering close business ties
(Frank & Shen, 2019; Nakateni, 1984; Prowse, 1992).
Such cross-ownerships and banking relationships also
foster peer-monitoring, thereby minimising information
asymmetry, mitigating the associated agency problems,
and reducing the cost of financial distress (Ji et al., 2019;
Kester, 1986; Nakateni, 1984). Thus, unlike market-based
economies, such as the USA and UK, the prevalence of
industrial groupings around major affiliated banks has
the tendency to shape corporate financing in a way that
defies the traditional capital structure theories. For
instance, the agency costs of debt (Jensen & Meckling,
1976), could be lower for several firms, regardless of key
firm-specific attributes. Additionally, the ownership
structure of Japanese banks permits a culture of over-
reliance on bank financing. Major banks, both local and
international, tend to be key shareholders, serving as the
main providers of funds, and are responsible for monitor-
ing the performance of the client firms (Aoki, 1990; Chen
et al., 2019; Kang & Shivdasani, 1995; Sheard, 1989). This
mechanism should help in aligning the incentives of a
firm's key stakeholders, ensuring that the firm is appro-
priately leveraged. Since the 1970s, however, the reliance
on bank finance is becoming less pronounced, as noted
in Kester (1986), whilst the proportion of finance gener-
ated internally has been rising, suggesting that the
agency relationship in Japanese firms is changing due to
reduced scrutiny by banks. Further, bank loans to Japa-
nese firms tend to be of short maturity and often incorpo-
rate covenants, with long-term debt that is either secured
on collateral or indentured (Kester, 1986). Such inden-
tures contain a pledge not to secure another long-term
debt ahead of it, or to limit the amount of the other long-
term debt that can be obtained. As noted by Kester
(1986), the short maturity of debt mitigates agency prob-
lems and permits firms to have relatively higher levels of
leverage. It is also, noteworthy, that the indentures con-
tained in the long-term debts also reduce the monitoring
costs of leverage.
Therefore, it could be argued that the ownership
structure and the lending relationship with major banks
shield Japanese firms from competitive pressure. Tradi-
tionally, competitive pressure, or the lack of it, drives cor-
porate capital structure (e.g., Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990;
Brander & Lewis, 1986; Chevalier, 1995a, 1995b; Cheva-
lier & Scharfstein, 1996; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1986;
Inderst & Vladimirov, 2019). For instance, Brander and
Lewis (1986) argue that leverage drives aggressive compe-
tition in product markets. Further, leverage creates an
opportunity for large incumbent firms in concentrated
(or less competitive) industries to predate on their
smaller, financially constrained counterparts (see,
Ahmed & Hla, 2019; Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990;
Fudenberg & Tirole, 1986). For instance, to mitigate
agency problems, optimal debt contracting is designed to
require periodic payments. However, the likelihood of a
leveraged firm's exit following its failure to make repay-
ments attracts incumbent firms to predate on the lever-
aged firm by undercutting the price of the latter. This
would normally not happen, or would be discouraged, in
competitive markets, as each firm accounts for only a
small proportion of the market. Consistent with this
view, Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) show that leverage
limits the ability of firms to invest in their market share.
They show particularly that more leveraged firms charge
higher prices during recession than their less leveraged
counterparts. Similarly, Fosu (2013) shows that the
impact of leverage on firm performance is moderated by
competition.
Whilst the foregoing discussions indicate that product
market competition influences the capital structure of
firms, with the tendency for lower levels of leverage in
concentrated or less competitive markets, the ownership
structure and the special bank lending relationship
enjoyed by Japanese firms make a special case for this
study. Further, the interaction of leverage and recession,
or economic downturns, makes a study of Japanese firms
overdue. For instance, Japan was the worst affected econ-
omy in terms of reduced exports during the 2007–2008
global financial crisis and suffered a 6% fall in GDP,
resulting in the lowest point of growth since the 1950s
(World Bank, 2017). The importance of these crises to
this study is from the perspective of corporate behaviour
in response to them. A number of studies (e.g., Mar-
Molinero, Menendez-Plans, & Orgaz-Guerrero, 2017;
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Omrane & Savaşer, 2017) have suggested changes in con-
sumer and corporate behaviour as important factors to
consider after recessionary times. For instance, Japanese
firms reduced their debts for fear of deflation, which
could affect their debt repayments (Nakaso, 2001).
Although Japanese firms were impacted by the 1997–
1998 Asian financial crisis, the 2007–2008 has been by far
their worst recession (OECD, 2013). Indeed, our paper
differs from previous studies, such as those of Harris and
Raviv (1991) and Chevalier (1995a, 1995b), as we focus
solely on Japanese firms, which enjoy the unique “Kei-
retsu”-style industrial characteristics. Thus, to the best of
our knowledge, our study is the first to examine how cri-
sis indicators interact with competition in order to deter-
mine their impact on capital structure decisions of firms.
Overall, our results provide support for the trade-off,
pecking order and agency theories. Our findings suggest
that firm-level factors that explain capital structure deci-
sions of firms in market-based economies are also appli-
cable in the context of Japan despite the unique
characteristics of Japanese firms. More specifically, firm
size, asset tangibility and volatility have statistically sig-
nificant relationships with leverage. Conversely, profit-
ability, liquidity and growth have negative statistical
relationships with leverage. These relationships are in
line with previous studies (e.g., Asad et al., 2019; Chen,
2004). This suggests that the industrial groupings (“Kei-
retsu”), ownership structure and close business ties expe-
rienced by Japanese firms have no significant role in
shaping the corporate financing decisions of firms inves-
tigated. Our empirical analysis also shows that, generally,
the financial crisis affected various determinants of capi-
tal structure in the context of Japan. Specifically, we
observe that the crisis and its aftermath impacted on the
tangibility–leverage relationship only in less competitive
industries. This suggests that major banks do exercise
caution regarding the threats of predation in less compet-
itive industries, which compels them to condition lending
on collateral. Additionally, in less competitive industries,
our empirical analysis shows that firm size does not drive
capital structure a period of financial crisis.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in sev-
eral ways. First, this paper provides fresh evidence on the
firm-level determinants of capital structure decisions of
Japanese firms. Second, given the unique characteristics
of Japanese firms, our paper provides evidence on the
extent to which the recent global financial crisis affected
the capital structure decisions of Japanese firms. Third,
we assess the extent to which the effects of firm-level
determinants of capital structure are moderated by the
level of product market competition. Fourth, we forge
ahead the adoption of price–cost margin (PCM), as a
measure of firm-specific competition and then, we assess
the extent to which the PCM drives various determinants
of capital structure. The rest of the paper proceeds as fol-
lows: Section 2 examines the relevant literature and its
theoretical underpinnings. In Section 3, we discuss the
sample, empirical design and measurement of key vari-
ables. Regression results are presented in Section 4 and,
finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW:
THEORY AND EMPIRICS
2.1 | Theoretical underpinnings
Capital structure decisions remain one of the essential
corporate decisions by executive managers of firms
(Ahmed & Hla, 2019; Alexandridis & Hasan, 2019). This
stems from the fact that from theoretical standpoints, a
wrong capital structure decision can have profound
implications for the cost of capital, riskiness and perfor-
mance of a firm. Within the corporate finance literature,
the irrelevance theory of Modigliani and Miller (1958,
1963) is often used as a theoretical basis for explaining
the financing decision of firms. This theory advocates
that no optimal capital structure exists and rates of return
from using debt are offset by the risk incurred by using
more debt. Following this, a review of the capital struc-
ture literature identifies various theories that that have
been at the forefront of the debate on how various firm-
level characteristics affect firms' debt-equity choice deci-
sions (Frank & Shen, 2019; Grosse-Rueschkamp et al.,
2019). For example, arising out of discussion of the irrele-
vance theory is the trade-off theory, which argues that an
optimal capital structure is determined by the costs and
benefits associated with the use of debt as against equity
(Nicodano & Regis, 2019; Ranasinghe, 2019). Thus, there
is either an optimal debt-equity ratio, or a range for this
ratio, whereby a firm's average cost of capital can be
minimised (Bartholdy, Mateus, & Olson, 2015; Brown,
Dutordoir, Veld, & Veld-Merkoulova, 2019; Scott, 1977).
In contrast, the development of Myers' (1984) pecking
order theory has led to the view that capital structure is
driven by the existence of information asymmetry and the
desire to reduce the transaction cost of finance. In the pres-
ence of information asymmetry, Myers (1984) observes a
hierarchy in firms' financing behaviour, whereby they first
prefer to use internal funds, followed by debt and finally
equity. Thus, this theory suggests that more profitable firms
will be less leveraged than less profitable ones. The agency
theory (Chen et al., 2019; Dakua, 2019; Jensen & Meckling,
1976), however, argues that capital structure is driven by
conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers,
whereby leverage is used as a disciplining device.
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2.2 | Empirical literature review and
hypotheses development
2.2.1 | Firm-level determinants of capital
structure
Despite their differences, the afore-mentioned theoretical
positions have received significant empirical support,
suggesting that various firm-level factors can drive firm
financing decisions in both local and international busi-
ness contexts (Inderst & Vladimirov, 2019; Ji et al., 2019;
Lemmon & Zender, 2019; Nicodano & Regis, 2019;
Ranasinghe, 2019; Wang et al., 2019). These factors
include firm size, profitability, asset tangibility, non-debt
tax shield, liquidity, volatility and growth (Antill &
Grenadier, 2019; Asad et al., 2019). To start with, theoret-
ical arguments on capital structure suggest that a firm's
size affects its debt–equity decision. Arguments put forth
by the trade-off theory suggest that large firms are more
diversified and thus, tend to have less volatile earnings
and less bankruptcy risk (Ji et al., 2019; Lemmon &
Zender, 2019). Chen (2004) noted that, large firms may
be able to reduce transaction cost during the issuance of
long-term debt. Thus, firm size should be positively
related to leverage. Degryse, Goeij, and Kappert (2010)
noted that larger firms tend to engage the services of
more financial and administrative staff, and therefore
become more knowledgeable about better financing
methods. This results in an improved bargaining power
with lenders; hence, a positive size–leverage relationship
is expected. The above theoretical argument is in line
with that of agency theory (Jensen, 1986) that suggests that
large firms are more likely to use long-term debt as a
disciplining device. In keeping with these theoretical argu-
ments, various studies (e.g., Agyei-Boapeah, 2015; De Jong
et al., 2008; Kayo & Kimura, 2011; Paligorova & Xu, 2012)
have documented a positive relationship between firm size
and leverage. However, the pecking order theory observes
that larger firms have lower asymmetric information
between insiders within a firm and the capital market.
These attributes permit them to issue informationally sensi-
tive securities like equity. Therefore, one can expect larger
firms to have lower leverage, as has been observed empiri-
cally in the literature (e.g., Danso & Adomako, 2014;
Titman & Wessels, 1988; Wang et al., 2019).
On profitability, the asymmetry of information as
observed in the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf
(1984) also suggests that firms prefer internal to external
finance. Hence, profitable firms are expected to have
lower leverage in their capital structure. Various empiri-
cal evidence (e.g., Agyei-Boapeah, 2015; Fama & French,
2002; Frank & Shen, 2019; Hall, Hutchinson, &
Michaelas, 2004) offers support for this by showing a
negative relationship between profitability and leverage.
Within the logic of the trade-off theory, however, profit-
able firms should borrow more to take advantage of tax
shield of debt. Indeed, this tax-effect argument also finds
support in the international context (e.g., Asad et al.,
2019; Chen et al., 2019; De Jong et al., 2008). Thus, in this
respect, the profitability–leverage relationship remains
empirical issue to be investigated.
In the case of asset tangibility, both trade-off and
pecking order theories offer support for a positive
tangibility–leverage relationship. Their argument ema-
nates from the fact that tangible assets serve as collateral
for securing loans, as they have a reduced asset specific-
ity, from the perspective of transaction cost economics
(Ahmed & Hla, 2019; Myers, 1977). There is a great deal
of empirical evidence that supports this argument. For
instance, Kayo and Kimura (2011) noted that, in coun-
tries with less developed bond markets, collateral offered
by fixed assets is more important to increase leverage.
Other empirical extensions (e.g., Chen, 2004; De Jong
et al., 2008; Kieschnick & Moussawi, 2018; Paligorova &
Xu, 2012) have also found a positive relationship between
asset tangibility and leverage.
In relation to non-debt tax shield (NDTS), both the
pecking order and the trade-off theories suggest a nega-
tive NDTS–leverage relationship. This argument stems
from the fact that a larger NDTS should lead to a reduc-
tion in the amount of taxable income. For instance, Fama
and French (2002) observe a negative relationship
between leverage and NDTS. Likewise, in De Angelo and
Masulis (1980), NDTS is treated as an interest expense
and thus, deducted in the calculation of corporate tax.
Hence, a greater NDTS should lead to lower leverage
(Antill & Grenadier, 2019; Paligorova & Xu, 2012).
Further, the theoretical argument on the liquidity–
leverage relationship is mixed within the finance litera-
ture. According to the trade-off theory, liquidity should
be positively related to leverage. Firms with higher levels
of liquidity are able to meet their debt obligations on time
and improve their credit rating (Nicodano & Regis, 2019;
Ozkan, 2001). Hence, liquidity reduces the threat of
default and offers firms the opportunity to leverage up.
The pecking order theory, in turn, states a negative rela-
tionship between liquidity and leverage. This explanation
is based on the suggestion that firms with greater liquid
assets may use less debt to protect the interests of share-
holders against those of debtholders. Accordingly, Prowse
(1990) points out that a firm's level of liquidity shows the
extent to which shareholders can manipulate their assets
at the expense of bondholders. In an international con-
text, De Jong et al. (2008) examine the capital structure
decisions of firms and provide evidence that liquidity is
both positively and negatively related to leverage.
4 DANSO ET AL.
Of the empirical studies that evaluate the relationship
between firm-level factors and leverage, the majority find
evidence that earnings volatility (a proxy for firm risk)
and leverage are negatively related (e.g., Chen, 2004; De
Jong et al., 2008; Ranasinghe, 2019). This relationship is
based on the logic that firms with volatile earnings have
a greater risk of default, which impacts negatively on
their ability to secure external finance or makes external
financing costly (De Angelo & Masulis, 1980; Ji et al.,
2019). Other studies have also shown a positive relation-
ship between earnings volatility and leverage (e.g.,
Grosse-Rueschkamp et al., 2019; Michaelas, Chittenden,
& Poutziouris, 1999). A plausible explanation for this is
that earnings volatility may drive firms into acquiring
additional debt with the purpose of achieving long-term
earnings stability. Thus, the overall effect of volatility on
capital structure remains empirical issue that is open to
further investigation and depends on the balance
between the supply-side and the demand-side effects.
Finally, the relationship between growth opportuni-
ties and leverage remains an empirical question in the
finance literature. In terms of the pecking order hypothe-
sis of Myers and Majluf (1984), high growth opportunity
firms have a greater level of information asymmetry.
Thus, one can expect higher growth firms to be more lev-
eraged since debt is less sensitive to adverse selection cost
(e.g., see Chen, 2004; Lemmon & Zender, 2019; Ozkan,
2001). However, both the trade-off and agency theories
predict a negative relationship. In the view of the trade-
off theory, growth opportunities that are in the form of
intangible assets cannot be collateralised. Thus, firms
with growth opportunities tend to borrow less and use
more equity (Alexandridis & Hasan, 2019; Céspedes
et al., 2010; Chen, 2004).
The foregoing discussions have established potential
relationships between firm-level factors and leverage, as
postulated by various theories and summarised in Table
1. We emphasise, however, that given the unique (e.g.,
“Keiretsu”) characteristics of Japanese firms, these firms
could attach less relevance to the hypothesised relation-
ships between firm-level factors and leverage. For
instance, the close lending relationship between the
majority of Japanese firms and larger multinational
banks could make information less asymmetric, thus
questioning the logic of the pecking order and agency
theories. Likewise, shareholdings by large major banks
and belongingness to major industrial groups could mini-
mise the threat of bankruptcy costs. In the light of the
above argument, we state our first hypothesis as;
H1 The relationship between firm-level characteristics and
capital structure of Japanese firms is less significant.
2.2.2 | Financial crisis and capital
structure
The 2007–2008 global economic recession intensified
interest in investigating the effects of financial crisis on
financing decisions of firms (e.g., Alexandridis & Hasan,
2019; Demirgüç-Kunt, Peria, & Tressel, 2020; Crotty,
2009). Indeed, our interest in the effect of crisis on capital
structure of Japanese firms is linked to the theoretical
TABLE 1 Firm-level factors and leverage
Variable Predicted sign Theory Empirical evidence
Firm size + Trade-off Barton, Ned, and Sundaram (1989)
− Pecking order Titman and Wessels (1988)
Profitability + Trade-off De Jong et al. (2008)
− Pecking order theory Dudley (2012)
Asset tangibility + Trade-off
Pecking order
Dudley (2012).
Non-debt tax shield - Trade-off
Pecking order
Danso and Adomako (2014)
Liquidity + Trade-off De Jong et al. (2008)
− Pecking order Ozkan (2001)
Earnings volatility + Trade-off De Jong et al. (2008))
− Agency Titman and Wessels (1988);
Growth + Pecking order Ozkan (2001)
− Agency
Trade-off
De Jong et al. (2008)
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suggestions that the increased uncertainties and risk
coupled with decline in returns would make lenders
unwilling to commit to long term investments (Dick,
Schmeling, & Schrimpf, 2013; Lemmon & Zender, 2019).
This is because financial crises are characterised by
higher likelihood of defaults, which increases risks and
the commensurate interest on credit (Frank & Shen,
2019; Gürkaynak & Wright, 2012). Theoretically, the
uncertainty associated with financial crisis could affect
long-term leverage from the perspectives of both firms
and lenders. A rise in uncertainty makes business pros-
pects oscillate in such a way that firms forgo projects
with long-term maturity so as to reduce their leverage
levels (Alexandridis & Hasan, 2019; Antill & Grenadier,
2019; Brunnermeier & Oehmke, 2013). That is, the pref-
erence for flexibility in finance options associated with
volatile economic conditions makes short-term leverage
preferable. Similarly, higher bankruptcy risk means that
lenders are unwilling to fund long term investments in
jurisdictions with high monitoring and bankruptcy costs
and where enforcement of contracts are strenuous (see
Diamond, 2004; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Nicodano &
Regis, 2019).
Demirguc-Kunt et al., (2020) recently uncovered that
firm leverage in general, long-term leverage and debt
maturity, all declined during and immediately after the
global financial crisis in both developed and developing
economies. These findings were particularly pronounced
for countries with less efficient legal and information
sharing systems, as well as countries with tougher restric-
tions on bank entry. Thus, their findings suggest that
firms use less long-term leverage, more short-term lever-
age and may resort to capital markets during or immedi-
ately after a global financial crisis. Given the unique
(Keiretsu) characteristics of Japanese firms, it would be
interesting to examine whether the close association of
firms to lenders make a significant change to financing
decisions during a financial crisis. On this basis, we pro-
ceed with our next the hypothesis as:
H2 The 2007–2008 financial crisis is less likely to have a sig-
nificant impact on the relationship between the firm-
level determinants and leverage of Japanese firms.
2.2.3 | Product market competition and
capital structure
Previous studies (e.g., Dakua, 2019; Elmagrhi et al., 2018;
Frank & Shen, 2019; Valta, 2012; Guney, Li, & Fairchild,
2011; Showalter, 1995) suggest the possible relationships
between a firm's product market competition and capital
structure. Generally, firms use a level of debt
commensurate with the level of competition. Theoretically,
the direction of the relationship remains a controversy.
While the limited liability approach assumes that equity
maximising firms employ debt to affect competition (a posi-
tive relationship), the predation model assumes the use of
less debt (a negative relationship) to avoid predation from
low geared competitors (see Liu, Jiang, & Lu, 2003; Rat-
hinasamy, Krishnaswamy, & Mantripragada, 2000; Barclay
and Smith, 1996; Inderst & Vladimirov, 2019; Ji et al.,
2019). Empirical studies (e.g., Cerasi, Fedele, & Miniaci,
2017) found that firms in product markets with higher com-
petition employ higher levels of leverage. This is the case
especially when there are competitors within the local mar-
ket who could take over firms with weak performance
(Cerasi et al., 2017). Similarly, Fosu (2013) also found a sig-
nificant positive relationship between capital structure and
product market competition in South African firms. That is,
higher competition induces the employment of higher debt
levels for varied reasons. These include the risk of competi-
tors winning the market share or acquiring weaker firms
(Cerasi et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2003; Lemmon & Zender,
2019; Nicodano & Regis, 2019). Indeed, our interest in prod-
uct market competition in Japan stems from the possibility
that unique industry factors could drive the product market
competition and leverage relationship. For example, factors,
such as the pricing of financial products relative to product
market competition (see Valta, 2012) may stifle leverage
levels or firm-lender relations (“Keiretsu”) may ease pricing
and access to leverage. On this basis, we state that;
H3 Product market competition significantly impacts the
observed relation between firm-level determinants
and leverage.
3 | DATA AND EMPIRICAL
METHODOLOGY
3.1 | Data description
We obtain annual financial data for Japanese firms from
the DataStream database for the period 1995–2013. The
selection of the firms was guided by the availability of
data. We started with 4,482 firms. However, we dropped
firms and years with missing key variables from our
dataset, resulting in an unbalanced panel data compris-
ing 4,284 firms and 61,000 firm-year observations.
3.2 | Measurements of variables
The measures used in this study were chosen in line with
the earlier discussed empirical and theoretical literature.
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This enabled us compare our results with prior research.
Following the extant literature (e.g., Dudley, 2012; Fosu,
Danso, Ahmad, & Coffie, 2016; Huyghebaert & Xu,
2016), we winsorised all variables at a 5% level on either
tail to mitigate the effect of outliers. Variables used are
summarised in Table 2.
3.3 | Descriptive statistics and
correlations
In Table 3, we present the summary statistics of the vari-
ables used in this study over the whole sample period.
The sample shows considerable variance for all variables.
A few findings are worth noting. The average value of
our main measure of leverage—book leverage (BLev) is
0.23. This low figure may reflect the fact that Japanese
firms are mainly equity financed. The average value of
long-term leverage is 0.10. This shows that a greater por-
tion of the capital structure of most of the firms studied is
short-term debt, as noted in Kester (1986). Firm size has
a mean value of 17.22 and a standard deviation of 1.46.
This shows that there are low levels of variability among
the firms examined. The minimum and maximum values
of these variables are 14.72 and 20.17, respectively,
suggesting a low degree of heterogeneity across firms.
There is further evidence that Japanese firms tend to be
highly liquid with a mean value of 1.82. This variable also
exhibits a low level of variability with a standard devia-
tion of 1.12. Moving beyond this, we investigate whether
the independent variables employed are likely to suffer
from collinearity problems. We first note that the correla-
tion (but not necessarily causal relationship) between our
dependent variables (BLev and LTlev) is very high. This
suggests that both variables are capturing a similar
aspect. With regards to the independent variables, the
correlation among them (as presented in Table 4) reveals
there is no multicollinearity issue. We further probe the
relationship between our independent variables and
leverage by plotting detrended leverage against the firm-
level variables. As shown in Figure 1, the line graphs sup-
port the correlation presented in Table 4.
3.4 | Estimation method
Following on from Section 2, we show theoretically that
firm capital structure is conditioned on firm-level factors
TABLE 2 Summary of variables
Variable Measurement Literature
Book leverage (BLev) Book leverage and market leverage are
analogously defined, except that cash
holdings are not subtracted in the
numerator (i.e., cash holdings are not
subtracted from total debt).
Verwijmeren and Derwall (2010)
Market leverage (MLev) Cash holdings are not subtracted from
the numerator - total debt.
Verwijmeren and Derwall (2010)
Long-term leverage (LTLev) Ratio of long-term debt to total assets Chen (2004)
Size (SZ) Log of total assets García-Sánchez and Noguera-
Gámez (2017); Ma, Yiu, and
Zhou (2014); Chen, Li, Shapiro, and
Zhang (2014); Faccio, Lang, and
Young (2010); Chen (2004); Tan,
Chng, and Tan (2001); Tian and
Lau (2001)
Profitability (PR) Ratio of operating income to total assets Kayo and Kimura (2011)
Tangibility (TAN) Ratio of fixed assets to total assets Chen (2004); Kayo and Kimura (2011)
Non-debt tax shield (NDTS) Ratio of depreciation expense to total
assets
Danso and Adomako (2014)
Liquidity (LIQ) Ratio of current assets to current
liabilities
De Jong et al. (2008)
Volatility (VOL) Ratio of standard deviation of operating
income to total assets
De Jong et al. (2008)
Growth (GR) The one-year growth rate of sales Fosu et al. (2016); Fosu (2013)
DANSO ET AL. 7
of size (SZ), profit (PR), asset tangibility (TAN), non-debt
tax shield (NDTS), liquidity (LIQ), volatility (VOL) and
growth opportunities (GR). Hence, in this section, we for-
mulate the following baseline regression empirical model
to test the predicted relationships:
BLevi,t = α+ λt + βXi,t−1 + εi,t−1, ð1Þ
where BLev is our measure of overall leverage (defined
as the ratio of total debt to total assets), X is the matrix
of the firm-level factors previously referenced and
defined in Table 1, and ε is a composite error term,
including time-invariant firm-fixed effects and an inde-
pendently and identically distributed component with
mean zero:
εi,t−1 = μi + υt−1: ð2Þ
For robustness tests, we modify our baseline model
by replacing overall leverage with long-term leverage
(LTLev), a relatively stable component of leverage. We
then obtain our second model as follows:
LTLevi,t = α+ λt + βXi,t−1 + εi,t−1: ð3Þ
To control for the effect of the recent global financial
crisis and industry competition, we estimate Equations
(1) and (2) for the full sample and separate sub-samples
of pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods, as well as for
high-competition and low-competition sub-samples. We
also interact crisis indicators with competition. To this
TABLE 3 Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 25th % 50th % 75th% Obs.
BLev 0.23 0.19 0.00 0.60 0.05 0.20 0.37 61,178
MLev 0.18 0.14 0.00 3.44 0.08 0.14 0.24 57,876
LTLev 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.33 0.01 0.07 0.16 61,147
SZ 17.22 1.46 14.72 20.17 16.17 17.11 18.17 61,343
PR 0.04 0.05 −0.08 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.07 59,665
TAN 0.29 0.17 0.02 0.63 0.16 0.28 0.41 61,207
NDTS 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.04 59,276
LIQ 1.82 1.12 0.60 4.91 1.06 1.46 2.20 60,798
VOL 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.03 52,130
GR 0.03 0.13 −0.20 0.34 −0.05 0.02 0.09 56,883
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the data. The sample comprises Japanese 4,284 firms over the period 1995–2013. The
variable descriptions are provided in Table 2 above.
TABLE 4 Correlations matrix
BLev MLev LTLev SZ PR TAN NDTS LIQ VOL GR
BLev 1.00
MLev 0.40* 1.00
LTLev 0.80* 0.29* 1.00
SZ 0.13* 0.32* 0.19* 1.00
PR −0.30* −0.22* −0.17* −0.01* 1.00
TAN 0.36* 0.47* 0.43* 0.18* −0.10* 1.00
NDTS 0.14* 0.16* 0.22* 0.10* −0.03* 0.42* 1.00
LIQ −0.58* −0.59* −0.41* −0.19* 0.19* −0.38* −0.14* 1.00
VOL −0.05* −0.30* −0.06* −0.35* −0.10* −0.22* 0.11* 0.20* 1.00
GR −0.07* −0.10* −0.01 −0.05* 0.40* −0.11* −0.01* 0.01* 0.03* 1.00
Note: This table presents the correlation matrix for the data. The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 2. * indicates signif-
icance at 1% or better.
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end, we follow the competition literature (e.g., Datta,
Iskandar-Datta, & Sharma, 2011; Fosu, 2013; Guney
et al., 2011; Haw, Hu, & Lee, 2015; Valta, 2012) and proxy
industry competition with PCM. The PCM captures the
extent to which firms can exercise higher pricing power
in the product market; hence, it is used as an inverse
measure of competition in product markets. We follow





where COGS is cost of goods sold and SG&A is sales, gen-
eral and administrative expenses.
We did not estimate our models, Equations (1) and
(2), using OLS, because this estimation approach fails to
control for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity, leading
to biased and inconsistent estimates (Wooldridge, 2009).
Hence, a practical approach is to adopt a panel fixed-
effect or random-effect estimation method. We confirm,
using the Hausman test, that the fixed-effect models are
most appropriate to account for the firm-level heteroge-
neity. Therefore, we base our analysis on the panel fixed-
effect models and use the pooled OLS models for robust-
ness checks.
To control for possible heteroscedasticity and autocor-
relation within firms, standard errors of our regression
coefficients are adjusted using Huber-White approach
and clustering at the firm level. Finally, following the
extant literature (e.g., Bonaimé, Öztekin, & Warr, 2014;
Danso & Adomako, 2014; Elmagrhi et al., 2018; Mc
Namara, Murro, & O'Donohoe, 2017; Zou & Xiao, 2006),
we lag the explanatory variables by one period to isolate
the analysis from the potential reverse causality between
our independent and dependent variables. The next sec-
tion presents our estimated results.
4 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 | Firm-level determinants of capital
structure across the entire sample period
Our baseline results are presented in Table 5. Two main
estimation methods are employed. The Hausman specifi-
cation test performed provided support for the fixed-
effect estimation and therefore we discuss our results
using the fixed-effect model estimations. The interpreta-
tion of the results are based on our main measure of
leverage (i.e., BLev) while MLev is used for robustness
check.
Therefore, from Model 2, we observe that firm size
(SZ) and leverage (BLev) are positively and significantly
related at the 1% level (β = 0.063). This is consistent with
the prediction of the trade-off theory. Intuitively, larger
Japanese firms, which could be more diversified and have
lower bankruptcy risk, pay less risk premium. Our find-
ings are consistent with prior studies (e.g., Chen, 2004;
FIGURE 1 Line fit of detrended leverage and detrended firm-level variables [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Frank & Shen, 2019; Grosse-Rueschkamp et al., 2019;
Ozkan, 2001; Pan, Lin, Lee, & Ho, 2015) that find a posi-
tive relationship between firm size and leverage.
On the relationship between profitability and lever-
age, we find that profitability (PR) is negatively related to
leverage (BLev) of Japanese firms. This is consistent with
the pecking order theory that prefers internal to external
finance (see also: Agyei-Boapeah, 2015; Danso &
Adomako, 2014; Hall et al., 2004; Ozkan, 2001).
We also observed that tangibility (TAN) and leverage
(BLev) are positively and significantly related at the 1%
level. This underscores the importance of asset base as an
added security in reducing a lender's risk (Danso &
Adomako, 2014; De Jong et al., 2008; Nicodano & Regis,
2019; Ranasinghe, 2019; Williamson, 1988). This tends to
support both the pecking order and the trade-off theories.
In addition, non-debt tax shield (NDTS) and leverage
(LEV) are negatively related. This is in line with other
empirical studies (e.g., Asad et al., 2019; Chen, 2004;
Chen et al., 2019; Fama & French, 2002; Ozkan, 2001)
and supports the logic of both the trade-off and pecking
order hypotheses.
Liquidity (LIQ) and leverage (BLev) are negatively
and significantly related at the 1% level. This contrasts
with the expectation of the trade-off theory that predicts
a positive relationship between liquidity and leverage. As
noted by Prowse (1990), firm managers could manipulate
liquid assets in favour of shareholders, as against debt
holders; hence, the negative liquidity-leverage relation-
ship. Our result supports other studies (e.g., Danso &
Adomako, 2014; Harris & Roark, 2019; Inderst &
Vladimirov, 2019; Ozkan, 2001).
The estimated coefficient of earnings volatility (VOL)
has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the
10% level. This outcome is in line with the trade-off the-
ory and consistent with prior studies (e.g., Kieschnick &
Moussawi, 2018; Danso & Adomako, 2014; De Jong et al.,
2008; Hall et al., 2004). This suggests that the demand-
side effect on the capital structure of volatility outweighs
the supply-side effects. This is not surprising for Japanese
firms because of the special relationship between these
firms and their banks.
The relationship between growth (GR) and leverage is
found to be negative and significant at 5%. This is
TABLE 5 Regression results for the full sample period—dependent variable: Overall leverage and long-term leverage
Book leverage (BLev) Market leverage (MLev) Long-term leverage (LTLev)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SZ 0.001 0.063*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.031***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
PR −0.648*** −0.466*** −0.274*** −0.050*** −0.208*** −0.155***
(0.025) (0.017) (0.024) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010)
TAN 0.204*** 0.071*** 0.199*** 0.189*** 0.177*** 0.097***
(0.014) (0.018) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012)
NDTS −0.172* −0.158** −0.118** 0.088 0.180*** −0.043
(0.102) (0.076) (0.058) (0.062) (0.060) (0.050)
LIQ −0.082*** −0.036*** −0.055*** −0.034*** −0.025*** −0.002*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
VOL 0.946*** 0.078* −0.762*** −0.136*** 0.433*** 0.018
(0.075) (0.042) (0.061) (0.036) (0.044) (0.028)
GR 0.046*** −0.009** −0.012* 0.025*** 0.061*** 0.011***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
_cons 0.333*** −0.831*** −0.365*** −0.408*** −0.038** −0.462***
(0.027) (0.066) (0.018) (0.048) (0.016) (0.046)
N 45,648 45,648 42,548 42,548 45,624 45,624
r2 0.413 0.257 0.474 0.143 0.285 0.084
N_clust 4,268.000 4,268.000 4,222.000 4,222.000 4,268.000 4,268.000
Note: This table presents the OLS and FE estimation results for the overall leverage and Long-term leverage determinants. Standard errors
robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as described in
Table 2. *Indicates significance at 10%.; **Indicates significance at 5%.; ***Indicates significance at 1%.
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consistent with the argument that a greater growth
opportunity leads to flexibility to engage in suboptimal
investment and therefore expropriate wealth from debt-
holders to shareholders in the form of asset substitution
effect (Chen, 2004; Ozkan, 2001; Wang et al., 2019). Our
result is in line with the argument of the agency theory.
Impliedly, high-growth Japanese firms will still be viewed
with an elevated level of scepticism by debt providers,
despite their strong relationships with major banks. Also,
the results from Model 4 (i.e., MLev) confirm the results
from Model 2. This suggests that our results are robust to
alternative definition of leverage.
The next set of regressions in Models 5 and 6 of Table
5 investigate the relationship between firm-level factors
and long-term leverage (LTLev). Based on Model 6, Evi-
dence obtained indicates that firm size (SZ), asset tangi-
bility (TAN) and growth (GR) are all positively and
significantly related to long-term leverage at the 1% level
(see also Chen, 2004). We also observe that profitability
(PR) shows a negative and significant relationship with
long-term leverage at the 1% level. In this case, the pre-
diction of the pecking order theory prevails as an expla-
nation for the lower level of debt at the most profitable
companies (Ji et al., 2019; Kayo & Kimura, 2011;
Lemmon & Zender, 2019). The relationship between
long-term leverage and non-debt tax shield, although
negative, remains insignificant. The relationship between
liquidity and long-term leverage produces a negative
value. But this result is only significant at 10%. We also
observe a positive but insignificant relationship between
earnings volatility (VOL) and long-term leverage. In
effect, our results are consistent with those of Models 2
and 4. This stems from the fact that LTLev is the most sta-
ble component of overall leverage. In sum, contrary to
our prediction (i.e., H1), we observe that firm-level fac-
tors that explain capital structure decisions of firms in
market-based economies are also applicable in the con-
text of Japan despite the unique characteristics of Japa-
nese firms.
4.2 | Firm-level determinants of capital
structure: The role of the crisis
So far, we have shown the role of the various firm-level
determinants of capital structure. In this sub-section, we
investigate whether the 2007–2008 financial crisis
impacted the traditional determinants of the capital
structure decisions of Japanese firms. To do this, we split
our data into three sample periods (i.e., pre-crisis, crisis
and post crisis) and re-estimate the regression models
using our two dependent variables. We present the
results in Table 6.
We find that, generally, most of the variables exam-
ined seem to have been affected by the recent global
financial crisis. However, the contributions of size (SZ)
and profitability (PR) appear not to have been substan-
tially affected by the financial crisis as their relationship
and statistical significance remain similar across the
three sample periods. For instance, the coefficient on size
remains positive across all sub-samples. Additionally, the
coefficients remain statistically significant for all models.
On profitability, we observe that the coefficient
remains negative and statistically significant across all
models. It is, however, worth noting that the absolute
size of the coefficient on profitability is smaller, relative
to the pre-crisis period, for both measures of leverage
during crisis and—to a lesser extent—in the post-crisis
period. This means that profitability (PR) is less impor-
tant to Japanese firms' capital structure decisions during
the crisis period. This lower sensitivity of leverage to prof-
itability can be reasonably attributed to the significant
support provided by the large affiliated and owner banks.
The effect of asset tangibility on leverage remains
consistently positive for both overall and long-term lever-
age across all sub-samples. The magnitude of these effects
is larger during the crisis and post-crisis periods. Further,
the role of TAN in the pre-crisis period is only significant
at the 10% level, but the same effect is significant at the
1% level in the crisis and post-crisis periods. Overall,
these findings suggest that the financial crisis and its
aftermath imposed some level of financial constraints on
Japanese firms, despite the close-knit relationship
between these firms and their banks. Thus, TAN remains
an important determinant of capital structure, especially
during crisis and post-crisis periods (see Almeida &
Campello, 2007). The findings suggest, unsurprisingly,
that the significance of the effect of asset tangibility
(TAN) on overall leverage and long-term leverage seems
to be driven by the crisis.
We note that the effect of non-debt tax shield (NDTS)
is largely insignificant except for the effect on long-term
leverage during the post-crisis period. The effect on over-
all leverage loses its statistical significance across all sub-
samples, whilst the effect on long-term leverage gains sig-
nificance (at the 5% level) during the post-crisis period.
These findings suggest that the post-crisis experience dis-
courages long-term borrowing where the benefit of the
tax shield is minimal. Hence, the effect of NDTS on over-
all leverage is driven by the post-crisis experience.
With respect to liquidity (LIQ), its effect on overall
leverage remains consistently negative across all sub-
samples. However, the effect is statistically significant (at
the 1% level) for only the pre- and post-crisis periods. The
effect on long-term debt is, however, mixed; although
negative for the post-crisis sample, it is positive for the
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pre-crisis period but statistically significant only at the
10% level. Thus, the evidence suggests that liquidity
reduces the leverage levels in periods prior to crisis and
after crisis; however, the observed relationship prior to
crisis appears to be driven mainly by short-term varia-
tions in debt levels. It further suggests, contrary to the
pecking order theory, that the global financial crisis
makes liquidity irrelevant in capital structure decisions.
Perhaps, liquidity crisis associated with crisis increases
the marginal value of liquidity to the extent that firms
become more inclined to buffer their levels by either
maintaining their debt levels or reducing their debt levels
only marginally in response to any increase in liquidity.
We also observe that, in almost all the sub-sample
periods, the effect of volatility (VOL) is negative, but sta-
tistically insignificant during the pre-crisis and the crisis
periods. This finding can be attributed to the close-knit
relationship between Japanese firms and major banks
within the country. However, there is a little, albeit weak,
evidence in the post-crisis period that volatility impacts
negatively on overall leverage, consistent with the
predictions of the agency theory and the evidence in Tit-
man and Wessels (1988).
The relationship between growth (GR) and leverage is
largely negative across the three sample periods but only
significant during the pre- and crisis periods. The coeffi-
cients on long-term leverage are significant during the
crisis period only. Further, it is noteworthy that the coef-
ficients of GR for the crisis period are about twice as high
as those for the pre-crisis period. Hence, it can be con-
cluded that growth opportunities negatively impact firms'
leverage, especially prior to and during crisis periods.
This could be attributed to an attempt to minimise the
agency cost of debt arising from the expropriation of the
debtholder, which is highly likely during crisis.
To conclude, contrary to our prediction (i.e., H2), we
note some evidence suggesting that the traditional capital
structure determinants show varied levels of sensitivity to
financial crisis. On the one hand, we note that financial
leverage is less sensitive to firm size and profitability dur-
ing financial crisis. On the other hand, we observe that
the sensitivity of financial leverage to tangibility and
TABLE 6 Regression results for the firm-level determinants of capital structure: The role of the financial crisis
Pre-crisis Crisis Post crisis
BLev LTLev BLev LTLev BLev LTLev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SZ 0.063*** 0.025*** 0.044*** 0.036*** 0.059*** 0.028***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005)
PR −0.366*** −0.140*** −0.126*** −0.037* −0.176*** −0.052***
(0.022) (0.014) (0.029) (0.020) (0.024) (0.016)
TAN 0.038* 0.062*** 0.125*** 0.086*** 0.092*** 0.073***
(0.022) (0.014) (0.045) (0.027) (0.025) (0.019)
NDTS −0.027 −0.010 0.203 0.045 −0.130 −0.199**
(0.094) (0.062) (0.180) (0.114) (0.108) (0.088)
LIQ −0.020*** 0.003* −0.005 −0.003 −0.011*** −0.003*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
VOL −0.048 −0.046 0.067 −0.049 −0.092* −0.028
(0.064) (0.041) (0.093) (0.063) (0.051) (0.037)
GR −0.012** 0.005 −0.023*** −0.013** −0.004 −0.004
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
_cons −0.789*** −0.347*** −0.564*** −0.552*** −0.803*** −0.404***
(0.102) (0.067) (0.207) (0.139) (0.153) (0.085)
N 23,406 23,404 9,775 9,772 12,467 12,448
r2 0.215 0.071 0.114 0.051 0.075 0.026
N_clust 3,692.000 3,692.000 3,511.000 3,511.000 3,426.000 3,425.000
Note: This table presents the FE estimation results for the entire sample period. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering
within firm are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 2. *Indicates significance at 10%; **Indi-
cates significance at 5%; ***Indicates significance at 1%.
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growth is higher during financial crisis, compared to that
observed in the pre-crisis and post crisis periods. Within
this spectrum, we find that financial leverage is insensi-
tive to non-debt tax shield, liquidity and volatility during
financial crisis. Whilst these findings point to some mixed
attributes of the special relationships amongst Japanese
firms and between these firms and their major banks,
they do suggest that affiliated Japanese banks help lessen
the potential pressure associated with liquidity and vola-
tility during financial crisis.
4.3 | Firm-level determinants of capital
structure: The role of competition
The previous section documents a substantial amount of
variation in the various firm-level determinants of capital
structure as a result of the 2007–2008 global financial crisis.
Given that firm ownership structure and the lending rela-
tionship with major banks may shield Japanese firms from
competitive pressure, we extend our baseline model and
add a novel dimension by examining the moderating role of
competition. The results of this are presented in Tables 7
and 8. The findings in the first set of regressions (columns
1–2) in Table 7 document the role of competition on capital
structure decision across all industries. In the second (col-
umns 3–4) and the last (columns 5–6) sets of our regression
analysis, we split our firms into high-competition and low-
competition industries, respectively, to highlight the moder-
ating role of competition on the traditional capital structure
determinants. We split our firms into high- and low-compe-
tition by using the median value (50th percentile) of the
PCM,1 where low-competition means PCM > 50th percen-
tile and high competition means PCM < 50th percentile.
First, the coefficient on PCM is negative and statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level. This suggests that
TABLE 7 Regression results for the full sample period after controlling for competition and its interactions (Using PCM)
All industries High competition Low competition
BLev LTLev BLev LTLev BLev LTLev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SZ 0.064*** 0.032*** 0.069*** 0.033*** 0.057*** 0.030***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
PR −0.436*** −0.157*** −0.304*** −0.088*** −0.501*** −0.227***
(0.020) (0.013) (0.028) (0.018) (0.028) (0.019)
TAN 0.074*** 0.098*** 0.086*** 0.096*** 0.058** 0.076***
(0.018) (0.012) (0.026) (0.016) (0.023) (0.016)
NDTS −0.122 −0.062 0.036 0.061 −0.122 −0.129*
(0.081) (0.053) (0.118) (0.076) (0.100) (0.068)
LIQ −0.034*** −0.001 −0.038*** 0.003* −0.030*** −0.006***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
VOL 0.073* 0.012 0.167*** 0.055 0.056 0.036
(0.044) (0.029) (0.064) (0.043) (0.058) (0.039)
GR −0.007 0.011*** −0.018*** 0.007 0.002 0.015***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
PCM −0.061*** 0.004 −0.002 0.045 −0.031 0.024
(0.022) (0.016) (0.036) (0.028) (0.026) (0.018)
_cons −0.794*** −0.452*** −0.861*** −0.488*** −0.654*** −0.394***
(0.067) (0.047) (0.098) (0.065) (0.097) (0.069)
N 42,120 42,096 21,479 21,464 20,641 20,632
r2 0.254 0.086 0.227 0.068 0.286 0.112
N_clust 4,196.000 4,196.000 3,282.000 3,282.000 3,264.000 3,264.000
Note: This table presents the FE estimation results for the entire sample period. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering
within firm are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 2. *Indicates significance at 10%, **Indi-
cates significance at 5%, ***Indicates significance at 1%.
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product market competition increases Japanese firms'
overall financial leverage and may enhance the benefits
of leverage (Dakua, 2019; Elmagrhi et al., 2018; Fosu,
2013; Guney et al., 2011; Valta, 2012). This observation is
consistent with the predatory theories of capital structure
(see, Ahmed & Hla, 2019; Alexandridis & Hasan, 2019;
Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1986). It
is also worth noting that, after controlling for the effect of
competition, all of the other variables retain their signs.
Further, except for growth (in column 1) and growth and
liquidity (column 2), all the other variables retain their
statistical significance.
In the next sets of regressions, we find that the effect
of firm size for overall leverage and long-term leverage
regressions is positive, statistically significant at the 1%
level and qualitatively similar to those reported for the
full sample. The results suggest that, although product
market competition marginally increases the impact of
firm size on financial leverage, firm size remains relevant
for capital structure decisions for firms in highly competi-
tive industries as well as for those in industries with low
levels of competition.
Similarly, the coefficient on profitability remains neg-
ative and statistically significant for both overall leverage
and long-term leverage across both high-competition and
low-competition industries. However, it is apparent that
competition moderates this effect, as the magnitude of
the coefficients are smaller for the high competition sub-
sample relative to those for the low competition sub-sam-
ple. These findings suggest that firms in highly competi-
tive industries rely less on internal financing; thus,
following a relatively less steep pecking order financing
choice.
Additionally, the coefficient of asset tangibility
remains positive and statistically significant at the 1%
level across sub-samples. This remains the case whether
leverage is measured as overall leverage or as long-term
leverage. The magnitude of the coefficient is also similar,
TABLE 8 Regression results for the joint role of competition and crisis (dependent variable: BLev)
High competition Low competition
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SZ 0.062*** 0.039** 0.059*** 0.064*** 0.014 0.067***
(0.010) (0.018) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010)
PR −0.186*** −0.129*** −0.097** −0.378*** −0.158*** −0.130***
(0.043) (0.040) (0.040) (0.033) (0.055) (0.034)
TAN 0.068* 0.054 0.060 −0.001 0.243*** 0.115***
(0.041) (0.069) (0.039) (0.028) (0.053) (0.031)
NDTS 0.196 0.454* 0.157 0.034 0.020 −0.209
(0.184) (0.257) (0.158) (0.122) (0.244) (0.141)
LIQ −0.025*** −0.003 −0.013*** −0.012*** −0.006 −0.007***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
VOL −0.024 −0.054 −0.066 −0.108 0.214 −0.111*
(0.118) (0.141) (0.076) (0.086) (0.148) (0.065)
GR −0.006 −0.030** −0.010 −0.005 −0.005 0.007
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006)
PCM −0.179*** 0.093 −0.057 −0.107*** 0.004 −0.062*
(0.060) (0.065) (0.043) (0.032) (0.059) (0.036)
_cons −0.777*** −0.432 −0.790*** −0.846*** −0.121 −0.991***
(0.170) (0.308) (0.238) (0.167) (0.260) (0.182)
N 9,561 5,467 6,451 10,441 4,245 5,955
r2 0.195 0.111 0.052 0.290 0.129 0.114
N_clust 2,474.000 2,366.000 2,265.000 2,599.000 1,963.000 2,113.000
Note: This table presents the FE estimation results for the leverage determinants by considering the joint role of competition and the crisis.
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as
described in Table 2. *Indicates significance at 10%, **Indicates significance at 5%, ***Indicates significance at 1%.
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suggesting no apparent evidence that competition plays
an interactive role.
Next, we find evidence that competition drives the
relationship between non-debt tax shield and long-term
leverage. The coefficient on non-deb tax shield is insignif-
icant across all models apart from in column 6, where
the dependent variable is long-term leverage. This obser-
vation is in line with both the trade-off and the pecking
order theories, but, perhaps to a considerable extent, may
be attributed to the firms' attempt to balance the risk of
predation with the potential benefits of the tax shield.
Further, the effect of liquidity on leverage remains
similar across both sub-samples of high and low competi-
tion, suggesting that competition does not significantly
moderate the effect of liquidity on leverage. The effect on
long-term leverage is, however, mixed as the coefficient
in the high-competition sub-sample is positive, albeit at
the 10% level. On volatility, we also note that the coeffi-
cient across both sub-samples is positive, although signif-
icant only for firms in industries with high competition.
Thus, the volatility–leverage relationship appears to be
driven by the levels of product market competition.
Moreover, the relationship between growth and lever-
age appears negative and insignificant, when we control
for competition in the regression. In addition to this, the
impact of growth across both high and low competitive
industries should be noted. The coefficient of growth is
negative and significant (at the 1% level) for highly com-
petitive industries (in column 2), but insignificant for less
competitive industries (column 5). However, the same
coefficient is insignificant in column 3, but positive and
significant in column 6. Thus, in relation to growth
opportunities, the findings suggest that Japanese firms
follow the pecking-order financing behaviour when
industry competition is high, but a trade-off pattern when
it is low.
Our discussion so far suggests that industry-level
competition interacts significantly with the traditional
firm-level determinants of the capital structure of Japa-
nese firms. Whilst there is no evidence that competition
has a systematic moderating role on the effects of tangi-
bility and liquidity on leverage, the evidence so far sug-
gests that competition has a considerable impact on the
relationship between the remaining firm-level factors
and leverage.
4.4 | Firm-level determinants of capital
structure: The moderating role of
competition and financial crisis
The next set of results, presented in Table 8, focus on the
joint role of competition and crisis on the relationship
between firm-level factors and leverage. We do this to
purge our results of any confounding effects of the inter-
action between competition and crisis, which could bias
our results.
Table 8 presents the results of the joint role of compe-
tition and crisis on the relationship between firm-level
factors and leverage. The estimated firm size (SZ) has a
positive and significant relationship with leverage across
all the sub-sample periods in highly competitive indus-
tries. We find similar results for the less competitive
industries, with one exception, where the effect relating
to the crisis period is insignificant. Thus, size does not
drive the capital structure of Japanese firms in less com-
petitive industries in a period of financial crisis. This
observation could be attributed to the combined risk of
predation and uncertainty. In addition, we observe that
the coefficient of profitability (PR) is consistently nega-
tively signed and statistically significant. Again, the coef-
ficients are smaller in magnitude in highly competitive
industries for all sub-samples of crisis, pre- and post-crisis
periods. This corroborates the earlier finding that
suggested that competition moderates the effect of profit-
ability on capital structure decisions.
On asset tangibility (TAN) and non-debt tax shield
(NDTS), we note the significant joint effect of competi-
tion and crisis. For firms in highly competitive industries,
the effect of TAN is significant only in the pre-crisis
period. In contrast, for firms in less competitive indus-
tries, the effect is significant for both crisis and post-crisis
periods. Thus, the crisis and its aftermath impacted on
the tangibility–leverage relationship only in low competi-
tive industries. This suggests that the major banks do
exercise some caution about the threats of predation in
less competitive industries, which compels them to con-
dition lending on collateral availability. Likewise, the
coefficient of NDTS remains largely insignificant other
than during financial crisis in highly competitive indus-
tries. Moreover, the results do not show any significant
moderating role of competition on the liquidity–leverage
relationship. Further, the coefficients on volatility remain
largely insignificant, except during the post-crisis period
in less competitive industries: the post-crisis effect in less
competitive industries turns negative, albeit at the 10%
level. Yet again, the effect of growth remains largely neg-
ative and significant for highly competitive industries,
but only during crisis. Finally, on the marginal effect of
competition on leverage, the effect appears to be signifi-
cant during the pre-crisis period only.
The forgoing analyses suggest that the firm-level
determinants of leverage are also relevant to Japanese
firm. This notwithstanding, we highlight the significant
joint interaction roles of competition and crisis. Control-
ling for the joint effects of competition and crisis, the
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evidence suggests a higher sensitivity of the size–leverage
relationship jointly to competition and crisis. Addition-
ally, we corroborate the accentuating effect of competi-
tion on the profit–leverage relationship in crisis, pre- and
post-crisis periods. Also, we show that the global crisis
and its aftermath jointly with competition accentuate the
sensitivity of leverage to asset tangibility. Finally, we
examine the extent to which crisis and competition inter-
act to impact on leverage. We observe from Table 9 that
the interaction between crisis and competition negatively
impact on both BLev and LTLev. The results obtained
generally provide support for our prediction (i.e., H3). In
general, the evidence obtained indicates that our results
do not provide support for any specific theory of capital
structure during crisis/non-crisis period or depending on
the industry competition.
5 | CONCLUSION
In this paper, we empirically explore the role of firm-level
factors in determining the capital structure decisions of
TABLE 9 Financial crisis
competition interaction
BLev LTLev BLev LTLev
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SZ 0.065*** 0.032*** 0.064*** 0.031***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
PR −0.431*** −0.157*** −0.441*** −0.147***
(0.020) (0.013) (0.017) (0.011)
TAN 0.080*** 0.099*** 0.071*** 0.097***
(0.018) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012)
NDTS −0.121 −0.067 −0.126 −0.033
(0.080) (0.053) (0.077) (0.050)
LIQ −0.033*** −0.001 −0.036*** −0.002*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
VOL 0.082* 0.009 0.075* 0.017
(0.044) (0.029) (0.042) (0.028)
GR −0.006 0.011*** −0.008* 0.011***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
PCM −0.054** −0.007
(0.022) (0.016)
Crisis 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Crisis * PCM −0.072*** −0.027**
(0.018) (0.012)
High PCM −0.006*** −0.001***
(0.001) (0.001)
Crisis * high PCM −0.011*** −0.005***
(0.002) (0.001)
_cons −0.882*** −0.490*** −0.844*** −0.467***
(0.068) (0.047) (0.067) (0.047)
N 41,477 41,453 45,648 45,624
r2 0.255 0.087 0.259 0.084
N_clust 4,186.000 4,186.000 4,268.000 4,268.000
Note: This table presents the FE estimation results for crisis competition interraction. Standard
errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm are given in parentheses. The sam-
ple and variable definitions are as described in Table 2. *Indicates significance at 10%, **Indi-
cates significance at 5%, ***Indicates significance at 1%.
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Japanese firms. We also investigate how product market
competition impact the observed relation between firm-
level determinants and leverage and the extent to which
these firm-level factors were influenced by the 2007–2008
global financial crisis. The unique characteristics of Japa-
nese firms provide a strong motivation for this study. Our
analysis offers support for existing evidence with respect
to the role of firm-level factors in influencing financing
decisions of firms. In general, the evidence obtained pre-
dominantly supports pecking order, trade-off and agency
theories. We also find persuasive evidence that the 2007–
2008 financial crisis affected almost all the firm-level
determinants of capital structure.
This study offers a number of implications. Theoreti-
cally, our findings extend the corporate finance literature
in a number of ways. First, while previous studies (e.g.,
Antill & Grenadier, 2019; Asad et al., 2019; Chen et al.,
2019; Danso & Adomako, 2014; Fosu, 2013; Muradoglu &
Sivaprasad, 2012) indicate that firm-level characteristics
are important determinants of capital structure, theoreti-
cal specification, as well as empirical examination of how
the level of product market competition drives the firm
level–capital structure relationship remains under-
explored. Thus, this study addresses this gap by relying
on data from Japanese firms, a hitherto less examined
sample for this purpose. In doing so, we add to a growing
literature on capital structure decisions of firms (e.g.,
Agyei-Boapeah, 2015; Dakua, 2019; Elmagrhi et al., 2018;
Frank & Shen, 2019; Grosse-Rueschkamp et al., 2019;
Kieschnick & Moussawi, 2018; Paligorova & Xu, 2012).
Second, we demonstrate the impact of the 2007–2008
financial crisis on the capital structure decisions of firms,
showing that Japanese firms were not isolated from the
impacts of the 2007–2008 financial crisis.
Our study also stresses the importance of product
market competition in the capital structure decisions of
firms in finance research. Thus, in a competitive environ-
ment, firm-level characteristics significantly influence the
financing behaviour of firms. In other words, firm-level
characteristics are extremely important, particularly for
firms that operate in a competitive environment. Overall,
our contextual research findings helps to extend the theo-
retical and practical understanding relating to the capital
structure decisions of firms. Despite our contributions, as
we have concentrated on a single country (Japan), future
studies should seek to extend the current research to
countries with similar unique characteristics, in order to
provide further insights into financing decisions of firms.
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TABLE A1 Regression results for the full sample period after controlling for competition and its interactions (Using HHI)
All industries High competition Low competition
BLev LTLev BLev LTLev BLev LTLev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SZ 0.063*** 0.031*** 0.062*** 0.030*** 0.071*** 0.032***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
PR −0.466*** −0.155*** −0.376*** −0.110*** −0.572*** −0.211***
(0.017) (0.010) (0.023) (0.014) (0.023) (0.015)
TAN 0.071*** 0.097*** 0.056** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.104***
(0.018) (0.012) (0.024) (0.015) (0.024) (0.016)
NDTS −0.158** −0.042 −0.191* −0.091 −0.084 0.021
(0.076) (0.050) (0.100) (0.067) (0.111) (0.070)
LIQ −0.036*** −0.002 −0.038*** −0.002 −0.033*** −0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
VOL 0.078* 0.018 0.168*** 0.040 −0.028 −0.012
(0.042) (0.028) (0.055) (0.036) (0.065) (0.045)
GR −0.009** 0.011*** −0.019*** 0.008* −0.001 0.012***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
HHI −0.005 −0.006* −0.008 −0.015** −0.002 −0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
_cons −0.831*** −0.463*** −0.738*** −0.439*** −1.038*** −0.515***
(0.066) (0.046) (0.087) (0.062) (0.094) (0.064)
N 45,648 45,624 21,984 21,969 23,664 23,655
r2 0.257 0.084 0.224 0.065 0.305 0.110
N_clust 4,268.000 4,268.000 3,155.000 3,155.000 3,484.000 3,483.000
Note: This table presents the FE estimation results for the leverage determinants by considering the joint role of competition and the crisis.
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as
described in Table 2. *Indicates significance at 10%, *Indicates significance at 5%, ***Indicates significance at 1%.
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